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1Human Error and CommErCial aviation aCCidEnts: 
a ComprEHEnsivE, FinE-GrainEd analysis usinG HFaCs
“Flying is not inherently dangerous, but to an even greater extent than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving ….” 
—Captain A. G. Lumplugh, British Aviation Insurance Group
INTRODUCTION
 
Since Silas Christofferson first carried passengers on his 
hydroplane between San Francisco and Oakland harbors 
in 1913, engineers and psychologists have endeavored to 
improve the safety of passenger and cargo flight. What 
began as an industry fraught with adversity and at times 
tragedy has emerged as arguably one of the safest modes 
of transportation today.
Indeed, no one can question the tremendous strides 
that have been made since those first passenger flights 
nearly a century ago. However, while commercial1 avia-
tion accident rates have reached unprecedented levels of 
safety, little, if any, improvement has been realized over 
the last decade for either the air carrier or commuter/air 
taxi industry (Figure 1). Indeed, some have even sug-
gested that the current accident rate is as good as it gets 
– or is it?
The challenge for the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) and other civil aviation safety organizations 
is to improve an already very safe industry. The question 
is where to start when most of the “low hanging fruit” 
(e.g., improved powerplant and airframe technology, 
advanced avionics, and the introduction of automation) 
have been “picked.”
Although percentages vary, most would agree that 
somewhere between 60-80% of aviation accidents are 
due, at least in part, to human error (Shappell & Wieg-
mann, 1996). That being said, it may be surprising that 
with few exceptions (e.g., Billings & Reynard, 1984; 
Gaur, 2005; Li, Baker, Grabowski, & Rebok, 2001; 
Shappell & Wiegmann, 2003a, 2003b; Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2003) most studies to date have focused on 
situational factors or pilot demographics, rather than 
the underlying human error causes of accidents. While 
no one disagrees that factors like weather, lighting (i.e., 
day versus night), and terrain contribute to accidents, 
pilots have little, if any, control over them. Likewise, 
little can be done to affect one’s gender, age, occupation, 
1  The FAA distinguishes between two types of commercial operations: 
those occurring under 14 CFR Part 121 – Air Carrier Operations 
and those occurring under CFR Part 135 - Commuter/air taxi 
operations.
or even flight experience, as flight hours alone are not 
the sole determinant of a safe pilot. 
Judging from current accident rates, situational and 
pilot demographic data alone have provided little in the 
way of preventing accidents, apart from identifying target 
populations for the dissemination of safety information. 
This is not to say that these variables are unimportant, 
nor would anyone argue that they do not influence 
aviation safety. However, given the multi-factorial nature 
of accidents (Baker, 1995), it may make more sense to 
examine these variables within the context of what we 
know about human error and accident causation. Perhaps 
then we might be able to affect human error and reduce 
aviation accidents beyond current levels. 
The problem is that, unlike situational and demo-
graphic variables that are tangible and well-defined (e.g., 
instrument meteorological conditions and visual meteoro-
logical conditions), human error is much more complex, 
making it difficult to apply any sort of taxonomy that is 
both easily understood and universally accepted. However, 
that may have changed with the development of the Hu-
man Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 
in the mid-1990s. In fact, since the U.S. Navy/Marine 
Corps fielded the original version in 1997, HFACS has 
been used to reliably investigate and classify human error 
in a variety of high-risk settings including civilian avia-
tion (Gaur, 2005; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2003a, 2003b, 
2004; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001a, 2003).
Figure 1. Air carrier and commuter/air taxi accident 
rates since 1985 (Source: NTSB).
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2HFACS
It is generally accepted that (Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2001a, 2003) aviation accidents are typically the result of 
a chain of events that often culminate with the unsafe acts 
of operators (aircrew). The aviation industry is not alone 
in this belief, as the safety community has embraced a 
sequential theory of accident investigation since Heinrich 
first published his axioms of industrial safety in 1931 
(Heinrich, Peterson, & Roos, 1931). However, it was 
not until Reason published his “Swiss cheese” model of 
human error in 1990 that the aviation community truly 
began to examine human error in a systematic manner.
Drawing upon Reason’s (1990) concept of latent and 
active failures, HFACS describes human error at each of 
four levels: 1) the unsafe acts of operators (e.g., aircrew, 
maintainers, air traffic controllers), 2) preconditions for 
unsafe acts, 3) unsafe supervision (i.e., middle-manage-
ment), and 4) organizational influences (Figure 2). A 
brief description of each causal category is provided to 
familiarize the reader.
Unsafe Acts of Operators
The unsafe acts of operators (aircrew) can be loosely 
classified into one of two categories: errors and viola-
tions (Reason, 1990). While both are common within 
2  A complete description of all 19 HFACS causal categories is available 
elsewhere (see Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).
most settings, they differ markedly when the rules and 
regulations of an organization are considered. That is, 
while errors represent authorized behavior that fails to 
meet the desired outcome, violations refer to the willful 
disregard of the rules and regulations. It is within these 
two overarching categories that HFACS describes three 
types of errors (decision, skill-based, and perceptual) and 
two types of violations (routine and exceptional).
Errors
Decision errors. One of the more common error forms, 
decision errors, represents conscious, goal-intended 
behavior that proceeds as designed, yet the plan proves 
inadequate or inappropriate for the situation. Often 
referred to as honest mistakes, these errors typically mani-
fest as poorly executed procedures, improper choices, or 
simply the misinterpretation and/or misuse of relevant 
information.
Skill-based errors. In contrast to decision errors, the 
second error form, skill-based errors, occurs with little 
or no conscious thought. Indeed, just as decision errors 
can be thought of as “thinking” errors, skill-based errors 
can be thought of as “doing” errors. For instance, little 
thought goes into turning one’s steering wheel or shift-
ing gears in an automobile. Likewise, basic flight skills 
such as stick and rudder movements and visual scanning 
refer more to how one does something rather than where 
one is going or why. The difficulty with these highly 
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Figure 2. The HFACS framework.
3practiced and seemingly automatic behaviors is that they 
are particularly susceptible to attention and/or memory 
failures. As a result, skill-based errors frequently appear 
- the breakdown in visual scan patterns, inadvertent acti-
vation/deactivation of switches, forgotten intentions, and 
omitted items in checklists. Even the manner (or skill) 
with which one flies an aircraft (aggressive, tentative, or 
controlled) can affect safety.
Perceptual errors. While decision and skill-based er-
rors have dominated most accident databases and have, 
therefore, been included in most error frameworks, the 
third and final error form, perceptual errors, has received 
comparatively less attention. No less important, these 
“perceiving” errors arise when sensory input is degraded, 
or “unusual” as is often the case when flying at night, in 
the weather, or in other visually impoverished environ-
ments. Faced with acting on imperfect or incomplete 
information, aircrew run the risk of misjudging distances, 
altitude, and decent rates, as well as responding incorrectly 
to a variety of visual/vestibular illusions.
Violations
Routine violations. Although there are many ways to 
distinguish between types of violations, two distinct forms 
have been identified based on their etiology. The first, 
routine violations tend to be habitual by nature and are 
often enabled by a system of supervision and management 
that tolerates such departures from the rules (Reason, 
1990). Often referred to as “bending the rules,” the clas-
sic example is that of the individual who drives his/her 
automobile consistently 5-10 mph faster than allowed 
by law. While clearly against the law, the behavior is, in 
effect, sanctioned by local authorities (police) who often 
will not enforce the law until speeds in excess of 10 mph 
over the posted limit are observed.
Exceptional violations. These types of violations, on the 
other hand, are isolated departures from authority, neither 
typical of the individual nor condoned by management. 
For example, while authorities might condone driving 65 
in a 55 mph zone, driving 105 mph in a 55 mph zone 
would almost certainly result in a speeding ticket. It is 
important to note that, while most exceptional violations 
are appalling, they are not considered “exceptional” be-
cause of their extreme nature. Rather, they are regarded 
as exceptional because they are neither typical of the 
individual nor condoned by authority.
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts
Simply focusing on unsafe acts, however, is like 
focusing on a patient’s symptoms without understand-
ing the underlying disease state that caused it. As such, 
investigators must dig deeper into the preconditions for 
unsafe acts. Within HFACS, three major subdivisions 
are described: 1) condition of the operator, 2) personnel 
factors, and 3) environmental factors.
Condition of the Operator
Adverse mental states. Being prepared mentally is critical 
in nearly every endeavor; perhaps it is even more so in 
aviation. With this in mind, the first of three categories, 
adverse mental states, was created to account for those 
mental conditions that adversely affect performance and 
contribute to unsafe acts. Principal among these are the 
loss of situational awareness, mental fatigue, circadian 
dysrhythmia, and pernicious attitudes such as overcon-
fidence, complacency, and misplaced motivation.
Adverse physiological states. Equally important, however, 
are those adverse physiological states that preclude the 
safe conduct of flight. Particularly important to aviation 
are conditions such as spatial disorientation, visual illu-
sions, hypoxia, illness, intoxication, and a whole host of 
pharmacological and medical abnormalities known to 
affect performance. It is important to understand that 
conditions like spatial disorientation are physiological 
states that cannot be turned on or off – they just exist. 
As a result, these adverse physiological states often lead 
to the commission of unsafe acts like perceptual errors. 
For instance, it is not uncommon in aviation for a pilot 
to become spatially disoriented (adverse physiological 
state) and subsequently misjudge the aircraft’s pitch or 
attitude (perceptual error), resulting in a loss of control 
and/or collision with the terrain.
Physical and/or mental limitations. The third and final 
category of substandard conditions, physical/mental limi-
tations, includes those instances when necessary sensory 
information is either unavailable, or if available, individu-
als simply do not have the aptitude, skill, or time to safely 
deal with it. In aviation, the former often includes not 
seeing other aircraft or obstacles due to the size and/or 
contrast of the object in the visual field. Likewise, there 
are instances when an individual simply may not possess 
the necessary aptitude, physical ability, or proficiency 
to operate safely. After all, just as not everyone can play 
linebacker for their favorite professional football team 
or be a concert pianist, not everyone has the aptitude or 
physical attributes necessary to fly aircraft.
Personnel Factors 
Often times, things that we do to ourselves will lead to 
undesirable conditions and unsafe acts as described above. 
Referred to as personnel factors, these preconditions have 
been divided into two general categories: crew resource 
management and personal readiness.
Crew resource management (CRM). It is not hard to 
imagine that when all members of the crew are not act-
ing in a coordinated manner, confusion (adverse mental 
4state) and poor decisions in the cockpit can ensue. Crew 
resource mismanagement, as it is referred to here, includes 
the failures of both inter- and intra-cockpit communica-
tion, as well as communication with Air Traffic Control 
(ATC )and other ground personnel. This category also 
includes those instances when crewmembers do not work 
together as a team, or when individuals directly responsible 
for the conduct of operations fail to coordinate activities 
before, during, and after a flight.
Personal readiness. Individuals must, by necessity, ensure 
that they are adequately prepared for flight. Consequently, 
the category of personal readiness was created to account 
for those instances when rules such as disregarding crew 
rest requirements, violating alcohol restrictions, or self-
medicating, are not adhered to. However, even behaviors 
that do not necessarily violate existing rules or regula-
tions (e.g., running ten miles before piloting an aircraft 
or not observing good dietary practices) may reduce the 
operating capabilities of the individual and are, therefore, 
captured here as well.
Environmental Factors
Although not human per se, environmental factors 
can also contribute to the substandard conditions of 
operators and hence to unsafe acts. Very broadly, these 
environmental factors can be captured within two general 
categories: the physical environment and the technologi-
cal environment.
Physical environment. The impact that the physical 
environment can have on aircrew has long been known 
and much has been documented in the literature on 
this topic (e.g., Nicogossian, Huntoon, & Pool, 1994; 
Reinhart, 1996). The term physical environment refers 
to both the operational environment (e.g., weather, 
altitude, terrain), as well as the ambient environment, 
such as heat, vibration, lighting, and toxins in the cock-
pit. For example, flying into adverse weather reduces 
visual cues, which can lead to spatial disorientation and 
perceptual errors. Other aspects of the physical environ-
ment such as heat can cause dehydration, which reduces 
a pilot’s alertness level, producing a subsequent slowing 
of decision-making processes or even the inability to 
control the aircraft. Likewise, a loss of pressurization at 
high altitudes or maneuvering at high altitudes without 
supplemental oxygen in unpressurized aircraft can result 
in hypoxia, which leads to delirium, confusion, and a 
host of unsafe acts.
Technological environment.  Pilots that often find them-
selves in a technological environment that can also have 
a tremendous impact on their performance. Within the 
context of HFACS, the term technological environment 
encompasses a variety of issues, including the design of 
equipment and controls, display/interface characteristics, 
checklist design, and automation, to name a few. Indeed, 
one of the classic design problems first discovered in 
aviation was the similarity between the controls used 
to raise and lower the flaps and those used to raise and 
lower the landing gear. Such similarities often caused 
confusion among pilots, resulting in the frequent raising 
of the landing gear while still on the ground. Likewise, 
automation designed to improve human performance 
can have unforeseen consequences. For example, highly 
reliable automation has been shown to induce adverse 
mental states such as overconfidence and complacency, 
resulting in pilots following the instructions of the auto-
mation even when “common sense” suggests otherwise. 
In contrast, unreliable automation can often result in a 
lack of confidence and disuse of automation even though 
aided performance is safer than unaided performance 
(Wickens & Hollands, 2000).
Unsafe Supervision
Clearly, aircrews are responsible for their actions and, 
as such, must be held accountable. However, in some in-
stances, they are the unwitting inheritors of latent failures 
attributable to those who supervise them. To account for 
these latent failures, the overarching category of unsafe 
supervision was created within which four categories 
(inadequate supervision, planned inappropriate opera-
tions, failed to correct known problems, and supervisory 
violations) are included.
Inadequate supervision. This category refers to failures 
within the supervisory chain of command as a direct result 
of some supervisory action or inaction. At a minimum, 
supervisors must provide the opportunity for individu-
als to succeed. It is expected, therefore, that individuals 
will receive adequate training, professional guidance, 
oversight, and operational leadership, and that all will 
be managed appropriately. When this is not the case, 
aircrew can become isolated, thereby increasing the risks 
associated with day-to-day operations.
Planned inappropriate operations. The risk associated 
with supervisory failures come in many forms.  Occasion-
ally, for example, the operational tempo and/or schedule 
are planned such that individuals are put at unacceptable 
risk and, ultimately, performance is adversely affected. As 
such, the category of planned inappropriate operations 
was created to account for all aspects of improper or 
inappropriate crew scheduling and operational planning, 
which may focus on such issues as crew pairing, crew rest, 
and managing the risk associated with specific flights.
Failed to correct known problems. The remaining two 
categories of unsafe supervision, the failure to correct 
known problems and supervisory violations, are similar, 
yet considered separately within HFACS. The failure to 
correct known problems refers to those instances when 
5deficiencies among individuals, equipment, training, or 
other related safety areas are “known” to the supervisor, 
yet are allowed to continue uncorrected. For example, the 
failure to consistently correct or discipline inappropriate 
behavior certainly fosters an unsafe atmosphere but is not 
considered a violation if no specific rules or regulations 
were broken.
Supervisory violations. This category is reserved for those 
instances when supervisors willfully disregard existing 
rules and regulations. For instance, permitting aircrew 
to operate an aircraft without current qualifications or 
license is a flagrant violation that may set the stage for 
the tragic sequence of events that may follow.
Organizational Influences
Where decisions and practices by front-line supervisors 
and middle-management can adversely impact aircrew 
performance, fallible decisions of upper-level manage-
ment may directly affect supervisors and the personnel 
they manage. Unfortunately, these organizational influ-
ences often go unnoticed or unreported by even the 
best-intentioned accident investigators. The HFACS 
framework describes three latent organizational failures: 
1) resource management, 2) organizational climate, and 
3) operational processes. 
Resource management. This category refers to the 
management, allocation, and maintenance of organiza-
tional resources, including human resource management 
(selection, training, staffing), monetary safety budgets, 
and equipment design (ergonomic specifications). In 
general, corporate decisions about how such resources 
should be managed center around two distinct objectives 
– the goal of safety and the goal of on-time, cost-effective 
operations.  In times of prosperity, both objectives can 
be easily balanced and satisfied.  However, there may 
also be times of fiscal austerity that demand some give 
and take between the two.  Unfortunately, history tells 
us that safety is often the loser in such battles, as safety 
and training are often the first to be cut in organizations 
experiencing financial difficulties.
Organizational climate. The concept of an organiza-
tion’s culture has been described in many ways; however, 
here it refers to a broad class of organizational variables 
that influence worker performance. One telltale sign 
of an organization’s climate is its structure, as reflected 
in the chain-of-command, delegation of authority and 
responsibility, communication channels, and formal 
accountability for actions.  Just like in the cockpit, 
communication and coordination are vital within an 
organization.  However, an organization’s policies and 
culture are also good indicators of its climate.  Con-
sequently, when policies are ill-defined, adversarial, or 
conflicting, or when they are supplanted by unofficial 
rules and values, confusion abounds, and safety suffers 
within an organization.
Operational process. Finally, operational process refers 
to formal processes (operational tempo, time pressures, 
production quotas, incentive systems, schedules, etc.), 
procedures (performance standards, objectives, documen-
tation, instructions about procedures, etc.), and oversight 
within the organization (organizational self-study, risk 
management, and the establishment and use of safety 
programs). Poor upper-level management and decisions 
concerning each of these organizational factors can also 
have a negative, albeit indirect, effect on operator per-
formance and system safety. 
PURPOSE
The goal of the present study was twofold: 1) to ex-
tend our previous HFACS analyses beyond military and 
general aviation (GA) to include a comprehensive analysis 
of commercial aviation; and 2) to combine the power 
of a theoretically derived human error framework (i.e., 
HFACS) with traditional situational and demographic 
data from the accident records. In accomplishing both 
objectives, the present study will begin to quantify the 
role human error plays in the genesis of commercial 
aviation accidents. 
METHOD
Data
Commercial aviation accident data (i.e., 14 CFR Part 
121 – air carrier; 14 CFR Part 135 – commuter) from 
calendar years 1990-2002 were obtained from databases 
maintained by the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) and the FAA’s National Aviation Safety Data 
Analysis Center (NASDAC). The NTSB reports two levels 
of investigation: factual and final. The factual investigation 
is a preliminary report that only includes basic descrip-
tive information associated with the accident (location, 
time-of-day, weather conditions, etc.) but lists no causal 
factors. The final report contains all the information in 
the factual report as well as the causal factors associated 
with the accident.  Consequently, only final reports were 
included in this study.
Also eliminated from consideration were accidents 
that were classified as having “undetermined causes” 
and those that were attributed to sabotage, suicide, or 
criminal activity (e.g., stolen aircraft). The data were 
culled further to include only those accidents that in-
volved aircrew or supervisory error. Of the remaining 
1,020 accidents, 181 involved air carrier aircraft and 
839 involved commuter aircraft.
6A summary of the remaining air carrier and commuter 
accidents involving aircrew or supervisory error is pre-
sented in Table 1. Sixty-eight percent of all commercial 
aviation accidents included in this study involved some 
form of aircrew or supervisory error.
Causal Factor Analysis Using HFACS
Six pilots were recruited from the Oklahoma City 
area as subject-matter experts (SMEs). All were certified 
flight instructors with a minimum of 1,000 flight hours 
at the time they were recruited. 
Each pilot was provided roughly 16 hours of instruc-
tion on the HFACS framework, which included didactic 
lecture and practice (with feedback) using the HFACS 
framework with NTSB/NASDAC accident reports. After 
training, the pilot-raters were randomly assigned acci-
dents so at least two separate pilot-raters independently 
analyzed each accident.
Using narrative and tabular data obtained from both 
the NTSB and the FAA NASDAC, the pilot-raters were 
instructed to classify each aircrew or supervisory causal 
factor identified by the NTSB using the HFACS frame-
work. Note that only those causal and contributory fac-
tors identified by the NTSB were classified. That is, the 
pilot-raters were instructed not to introduce additional 
casual factors that were not identified by the original 
investigation. 
After the pilot-raters made their initial classifications 
of the NTSB causal factors (i.e., skill-based error, deci-
sion-error, etc.), the two independent ratings were com-
pared. Where disagreements existed, the corresponding 
pilot-raters were instructed to reconcile their differences, 
and the consensus classification was included in the 
database for further analysis. Overall, pilot-raters agreed 
on the classification of causal factors within the HFACS 
framework more than 85% of the time, an excellent 
level of agreement considering that this was essentially a 
classification/decision-making task.
Human Factors Quality Assurance
The data used in this study were drawn from NTSB/
NASDAC investigation reports that are often highly 
technical in nature, requiring a fundamental under-
standing of specific terms, flight conditions, and the 
overall domain of aviation to be effectively classified 
and coded. As aviation SMEs, the pilot-raters were able 
to clearly understand all aspects of the accident report. 
Consequently, they were considered the appropriate 
personnel for conducting the overall HFACS analysis of 
the commercial accident reports.
Pilots, however, are not SMEs in the domain of psychol-
ogy or human factors and may not fully understand the 
theoretical underpinnings associated with the various error 
types within the HFACS framework. As a result, pilots 
might classify human error data somewhat differently 
than SMEs in human factors. On the other hand, pilots 
in this study were trained on HFACS, which provided 
some level of expertise when assessing human error. In 
fact, an earlier study addressed this issue by comparing 
the coded database of a commercial pilot rater to that of a 
psychologist and found the data to be reliable (Wiegmann 
& Shappell, 2001a).
Nonetheless, to ensure that the pilot raters grasped 
the psychological aspects underlying human error and 
HFACS, four additional SMEs (all co-authors of this 
manuscript) with expertise in human factors/aviation 
psychology examined each HFACS classification that the 
pilot SMEs had assigned to a given human cause factor. 
Table 1. Frequency of Accidents Associated with an Aircrew or Supervisory 
Human Error. 
Aircrew/Supervisory Error Only 
Year Air Carrier Commuter Combined 
Total
Accidents Percentage 
1990 9 81 90 134 67% 
1991 10 71 81 121 67% 
1992 9 67 76 103 74% 
1993 14 67 81 99 82% 
1994 11 74 85 113 75% 
1995 13 59 72 105 69% 
1996 14 71 85 123 69% 
1997 22 68 90 130 69% 
1998 14 62 76 121 63% 
1999 15 62 77 120 64% 
2000 20 62 82 135 61% 
2001 18 52 70 120 58% 
2002 12 43 55 92 60% 
Total 181 839 1020 1516 68% 
Average 13.92 64.54 78.46 116.6  
Note: Percentages represent the percent of commercial (both air carrier and commuter) aviation 
accidents associated with aircrew/supervisory error. For example, 90 of 134 commercial aviation 
accidents (67%) were associated with aircrew and/or supervisory error. 
7To aid in the process, descriptive statistics were used to 
identify outliers in the data, after which the corresponding 
NTSB/NASDAC report was obtained. The reports were 
then independently reviewed by a minimum of two hu-
man factors SMEs for agreement with the previous codes. 
After the human factors SMEs came to a consensus, the 
codes were either changed in the database or left as the 
pilot SMEs originally coded them. In the end, less than 
5% of all causal factors were modified during the human 
factors quality assurance process.
RESULTS
Overall
A summary of the HFACS analyses of commercial 
aviation accidents can be found in Table 2. What is ap-
parent from the data is that the majority of human causal 
factors identified in the database involved aircrew and their 
environment (i.e., unsafe acts of operators and preconditions 
for unsafe acts) rather than supervisory or organizational 
factors. Nevertheless, when organizational influences 
were observed, they typically involved operational processes 
such as inadequate or non-existent procedures, directives, 
standards, and/or requirements, or in the case of com-
muter operations, inadequate surveillance of operations. 
Unsafe supervision, on the other hand, typically involved 
inadequate supervision, in general, or the failure to provide 
adequate training. 
As anticipated, a large number of environmental con-
ditions were identified within the commercial aviation 
database, particularly those associated with aspects of the 
physical environment like weather and lighting. However, 
they were not uniformly distributed across air carrier 
and commuter operations, as considerably more issues 
associated with the physical environment were observed 
during commuter (63%) than air carrier operations 
(37%). In contrast, the accident record revealed surpris-
ingly few problems associated with the technological 
environment.
Preconditions associated with aircrew were also fre-
quently observed within the accident record. For instance, 
crew resource management failures were identified in nearly 
one out of every five air carrier accidents examined. Even 
more interesting, the nature of the CRM failure differed 
Table 2. Frequency and percentage of accidents associated with 
each HFACS causal category by type of operation.
 HFACS Category Air Carrier Commuter Total
Organizational Influences N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Resource Management 4 (2.2)  0 (0.0)  4 (0.4) 
Organizational Climate 0 (0.0)  4 (0.5)  4 (0.4) 
Operational Process 21 (11.6)  29 (3.5)  50 (4.9) 
Unsafe Supervision    
Inadequate Supervision 15 (8.3)  21 (2.5)  36 (3.5) 
Planned Inappropriate Operations 3 (1.7)  5 (0.6)  8 (0.8) 
Failed to Correct Known Problems 0 (0.0)  0 (0.0)  0 (0.0) 
Supervisory Violations 0 (0.0)  2 (0.2)  2 (0.2) 
Preconditions of Unsafe Acts    
Environmental Conditions    
Technological Environment 11 (6.1)  4 (0.5)  15 (1.5) 
Physical Environment 67 (37.0) 525 (62.6) 592 (58.0) 
Conditions of the Operator    
Adverse Mental States 6 (3.3)  60 (7.2)  66 (6.5) 
Adverse Physiological States 6 (3.3)  18 (2.1)  24 (2.4) 
Physical/Mental Limitations 6 (3.3)  39 (4.6)  45 (4.4) 
Personnel Factors    
Crew Resource Management 34 (18.8)  75 (8.9) 109 (10.7) 
Personal Readiness 0 (0.0)  3 (0.4)  3 (0.3) 
Unsafe Acts of the Operator    
Skill-based Errors 77 (42.5) 499 (59.5) 576 (56.5) 
Decision Errors 71 (39.2) 303 (36.1) 374 (36.7) 
Perceptual Errors 10 (5.5)  56 (6.7)  66 (6.5) 
Violations 31 (17.1) 205 (24.4) 236 (23.1) 
Note: Numbers in the table are frequencies and percentages (parentheses) of accidents that 
involved at least one instance of an HFACS category. For example 77 of the 181 air 
carrier accidents (77/181 or 42.5%) were associated with at least one skill-based error. 
Because accidents are generally associated with more than one causal factor, the 
percentages in the table do not add up to 100%. 
8between the two commercial operations. That is, while 
over 60% of the CRM failures associated with air carrier 
accidents involved “inflight” CRM failures (inflight crew 
coordination, communication, monitoring of activities, 
etc.), over 80% of the CRM failures observed during 
commuter operations involved “preflight” activities (such 
as planning and briefing).
Although arguably not as common, the condition of 
the operator was cited as a causal factor in several of the 
accidents examined. For instance, adverse mental states 
(e.g., diverted attention, pressure, etc.) were identified 
in just over 7% of the commuter accidents, followed 
by physical/mental limitations (lack of experience) and 
adverse physiological states (spatial disorientation, visual 
illusions, etc.).
As seen in other aviation operations (Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 1995, 1997, 2003a, 2003b, 2004; Wiegmann 
& Shappell, 1997, 2001a, 2001b, 2003) the majority of 
commercial aviation accident causal factors were found 
at the unsafe act level. Indeed, just over half of the ac-
cidents were associated with at least one skill-based error, 
followed by decision errors (36.7%) and violations of the 
rules and regulations (23.1%). Perceptual errors were 
much less common, accounting for roughly 7% of the 
accidents in the database. 
Because of the differences between air carrier and 
commuter operations (i.e., airframes, crew composi-
tion, size of the organization, etc.) it was anticipated 
that there would be differences in the pattern of human 
error observed - particularly where the unsafe acts of 
aircrew were concerned. However, a comparison of the 
unsafe acts committed during these operations (Figure 3) 
yielded very little disparity. In fact, the only significant 
difference involved skill-based errors, which were nearly 
twice as likely to have occurred during accidents involving 
commuter than air carrier aircraft (Χ2 = 17.368, p<.001; 
odds ratio = 1.982). On the surface, it did appear that 
slightly more violations were committed during accidents 
involving commuter than air carrier operations; however, 
the difference was not statistically significant.4 Likewise, 
the small differences observed for decision and perceptual 
errors did not reach statistical significance.
Similar to other civil aviation accident data we have 
reported (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2003a, 2003b, 2004; 
Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003), there was little variation 
3  The overarching category of violations was used rather than the subordinate 
categories of routine and exceptional violations because differentiating between 
the two, post hoc, is complicated by the fact that most investigations do not 
provide the detail necessary to make a reliable distinction between the two 
types of violations.
4  Given that Chi square analyses are strongly influenced by sample size, a 
conservative p-value of p<.001 was adopted to reduce the likelihood that 
spurious significant results would be obtained.
in the distribution of unsafe acts committed annually by 
aircrew flying either air carrier or commuter operations 
(Figure 4). When accidents occurred in either type of 
commercial operation, they were typically associated with 
more skill-based errors, followed by decision errors, viola-
tions, and perceptual errors, respectively. This was true 
even though the air carrier data had to be averaged over 
3-4 year blocks due to the small number of accidents in 
the database (Figure 4A). Moreover, with the exception 
of violations, which has shown a slight increase since the 
1993-1995 time frame, the annualized data were relatively 
flat, suggesting that there has been little impact on any 
specific type of human error over the last 13 years.
14 CFR Part 135 - Commuter Operations
Because of the relatively small number of air carrier 
accidents in the database related to aircrew/supervisory 
error, additional fine-grained analyses of those data were 
not possible. However, the same was not true for com-
muter operations. Therefore, a series of more detailed 
analyses were conducted using these data.
Visual Conditions
Given the relatively large percentage of accidents associ-
ated with physical conditions, in particular those associated 
with prevailing weather conditions and lighting, it seemed 
reasonable to begin with these two environmental causal 
factors. As can be seen in Figure 5A, just over 70% of the 
accidents occurred during visual meteorological condi-
tions (VMC). Likewise, roughly 70% of the accidents 
occurred in broad daylight (Figure 5B).
To capitalize on the threat posed by both environ-
mental causal factors, the two were combined to create 
a new variable that captured the “visual” conditions at 
the time of the accident.  Specifically, two levels of visual 
conditions were created: 1) clear visual conditions, which 
included accidents that occurred during VMC and day-
light conditions, and 2) impoverished visual conditions, 
which included accidents occurring during instrument 
meteorological conditions (IMC) or at twilight/night.
Unlike the results seen with weather and lighting con-
ditions alone, when they were combined, the percentage 
of accidents occurring in clear visual conditions were 
only marginally higher than those occurring in visually 
impoverished conditions (Figure 5C). It would appear 
that, while weather and lighting conditions are important 
factors in aviation, their impact is potentially magnified 
when a pilot’s ability to see outside the aircraft is taken 
into consideration.  
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by unsafe acts (Panel D).
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Naturally, one would expect the pattern of human error 
to be different during accidents in clear versus visually 
impoverished conditions. Indeed, when visual conditions 
were compared across the unsafe acts of aircrew, an inter-
esting pattern of human error emerged. While skill-based 
errors were the most common error form observed during 
accidents in clear and impoverished conditions (Figure 
5D), violations were five times more likely to be attributed 
to accidents in visually impoverished conditions (Χ2 = 
92.332, p<.001; odds ratio = 5.077).
Upon closer examination (Table 3), intentional flight 
into IMC while operating under visual flight rules (i.e., 
VFR flight into IMC) accounted for nearly a third of the 
violations observed during impoverished visual condi-
tions.  In addition, the failure to adhere to procedures/
directives (violation), poor inflight planning/decision 
making (decision error), the loss of control in-flight (skill-
based errors), and the failure to maintain sufficient airspeed 
(skill-based error) all were commonly cited as causes during 
accidents in visually impoverished conditions.
The failure to adhere to procedures/directives (viola-
tion) was also frequently seen among accidents in clear 
conditions, as was poor in-flight planning/decision-mak-
ing (decision error). However, unlike impoverished visual 
conditions, commuter accidents occurring in the clear 
were often associated with the selection of unsuitable 
terrain (decision error) and the inability to compensate 
for winds (skill-based error).
Injury Severity
Previous investigations of GA accidents have shown 
distinct differences in the pattern of human error associ-
ated with fatal and non-fatal aviation accidents (Shappell 
& Wiegmann, 2003a, 2003b; Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2003).  A similar examination of commuter accidents 
revealed that roughly 30% of all commuter accidents 
resulted in at least one fatality (Figure 6A). 
As with the findings regarding visual conditions, 
skill-based errors were associated with the majority of 
fatal and non-fatal accidents followed by decision errors, 
violations, and perceptual errors (Figure 6B). Of note 
however, violations were more than three times as likely to 
be associated with fatal accidents (Χ2 = 48.239, p<.001; 
odds ratio = 3.145).
Upon closer examination, it appears that causal fac-
tors such as intentional VFR flight into IMC (violation), 
poor in-flight planning/decision making (decision error), 
and control of the aircraft and airspeed (skill-based error) 
were the most frequently cited aircrew errors associated 
with fatal accidents (Table 4). In contrast, non-fatal 
accidents appear to be more closely associated with the 
failure to compensate for winds (skill-based error), loss 
of directional control on the ground (skill-based error), 
selection of unsuitable terrain (decision error), poor in-
flight planning/decision-making (decision error), and the 
failure to follow procedures/directives (violation).
Given the similarity in the pattern of human errors 
associated with visual conditions and injury severity (fatal 
Table 3. Commuter Unsafe Acts Fine-Grained Analysis by Clear vs. Impoverished.
SKILL – BASED ERRORS 
CLEAR IMPOVERISHED 
Subject   N (%) Subject   N (%) 
Compensation for Wind Conditions 42 (10.8) Aircraft Control 28 (10.6) 
Airspeed 38 (9.7) Airspeed 27 (10.2) 
Visual Lookout 32 (8.2) Clearance 21 (7.9) 
DECISION ERRORS 
CLEAR IMPOVERISHED
Subject   N (%) Subject   N (%) 
Unsuitable Terrain Selection 43 (21.5) In-Flight Planning/Decision 37 (24.3) 
In-Flight Planning/Decision 38 (19.0) Flight into Known Adverse Weather 11 (7.2) 
Pre-flight Planning/Decision 21 (10.5) Pre-flight Planning/Decision 9 (5.9) 
Violations
CLEAR IMPOVERISHED
Subject   N (%) Subject   N (%) 
Procedures/Directives 15 (23.8) Intentional VFR Flight into IMC 53 (30.1) 
Checklist 9 (14.3) Procedures/Directives 39 (22.2) 
Refueling 6 (9.5) Flight into Known Adverse Weather 10 (5.7) 
Note: Percentages in the table reflect the percentage of a given causal factor within the HFACS category (e.g., 
compensation for wind conditions accounted for 42 of 390 [10.8%] skill-based errors occurring in clear 
conditions). 
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Table 4. Commuter Unsafe Acts Fine-Grained Analysis by Non-Fatal vs. Fatal.
SKILL – BASED ERRORS 
NON - FATAL FATAL
Subject      N (%) Subject      N (%)
Compensation for Wind Conditions 44 (9.6) Airspeed 35 (17.9) 
Directional Control 44 (9.6) Aircraft Control 23 (11.7) 
Visual Lookout 35 (7.6) Proper Altitude 16 (8.2) 
DECISION ERRORS 
NON - FATAL FATAL
Subject      N (%) Subject      N (%)
Unsuitable Terrain Selection 46 (19.3) In-Flight Planning/Decision 40 (35.1) 
In-Flight Planning/Decision 35 (14.7) Flight into Known Adverse Weather 9 (7.9) 
Planning/Decision 22 (9.2) Planning/Decision 8 (7.0) 
VIOLATIONS
NON - FATAL FATAL
Subject      N (%) Subject      N (%)
Procedures/Directives 23 (19.5) Intentional VFR Flight into IMC 37 (30.6) 
Intentional VFR Flight into IMC 20 (16.9) Procedures/Directives 28 (23.1) 
Checklist 12 (10.2) Aircraft Weight and Balance 9 (7.4) 
Note: Percentages in the table reflect the percentage of a given causal factor within the HFACS category (e.g., 
compensation for wind conditions accounted for 44 of 459 [9.6%] skill-based errors occurring in non-fatal commuter 
accidents).
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vs. non-fatal), it made sense to examine the combina-
tion of the two variables. As illustrated in Figure 7, the 
largest percentage of fatal commuter accidents occurred 
in visually impoverished conditions. In contrast, when 
the accident occurred in clear visual conditions, a much 
smaller percentage resulted in fatalities. Indeed, commuter 
accidents were over four times more likely to result in 
fatalities if they occurred in visually impoverished condi-
tions (Χ2 = 83.978, p<.001; odds ratio = 4.256).
Perhaps more important, skill-based errors were still 
the most frequently cited human error during fatal ac-
cidents in impoverished visual conditions (Figure 8). 
However, the differences observed in previous analyses 
between skill-based errors, decision errors, and violations 
were much less obvious. Still, fully one-half of the fatal 
accidents occurring in visually impoverished conditions 
involved at least one violation – often intentional VFR 
flight into IMC (Table 5). Not surprising, given the 
environmental conditions at the time, poor in-flight 
planning (decision error) was also commonly cited among 
this subset of the data.
Regional Comparison
Our previous investigation of GA accidents (Detwiler, 
Hackworth, Holcomb, Boquet, Pfleiderer, Wiegmann, & 
Shappell, 2006) suggested that differences in the pattern 
of human error associated with commuter accidents in 
Alaska versus the rest of the U.S. might exist. However, 
unlike GA, our regional investigation of commuter avia-
tion accidents revealed no significant differences between 
Alaska and the rest of the U.S. with regard to the various 
categories of unsafe acts.  Even the fine-grained analysis 
of unsafe acts revealed similar patterns for commuter 
accidents occurring in Alaska and the rest of the U.S. 
(Table 6). For instance, the failure to maintain adequate 
altitude/clearance was the most frequently cited skill-based 
error in Alaska and the rest of the U.S. 
The only notable difference involved the type of vio-
lations and decision errors committed in Alaska versus 
the rest of the U.S. Specifically, while the most common 
violation occurring in the rest of the U.S. involved the 
failure to adhere to procedures and directives; intentional 
VFR flight into IMC was more common in Alaska. It was 
also noteworthy that the decision to take off or land on 
unsuitable terrain was observed more often in Alaska.
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we examined a variety of human 
and environmental factors associated with more than 
1000 commercial aviation accidents over a 13-year time 
frame. Given the sheer number of causal factors associ-
ated with these accidents, one might believe that there 
are literally thousands of ways to crash an aircraft. The 
results of this study, however, demonstrate that accidents 
appearing to be unique at first glance can be organized 
based upon underlying situational, demographic, and 
cognitive mechanisms of accident causation. In this way, 
previously unidentified trends in the accident record can 
be exposed.
Overall
Generally speaking, nearly 70% of the “commercial” 
aviation accidents occurring between 1990 and 2002 were 
associated with some manner of aircrew or supervisory 
error. However, the percentage varied slightly when air 
carrier (45%) and commuter (75%) aviation accidents 
were considered separately. This finding is consistent with 
results reported elsewhere (Li et al., 2001). However, 
while other studies typically focused on situational and 
demographic data, this study employed a human error 
framework (HFACS) to reveal the specific types of human 
error associated with commercial aviation accidents.
Figure 8. Percentage of unsafe acts committed 
by commuter aircrews during impoverished 
visual conditions that resulted in fatalities.
Figure 7. Injury severity by visual conditions.
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Table 5. Fine-Grained Analysis for Fatal 
Accidents Associated with Commuter 
Operations in Impoverished Conditions.
SKILL – BASED ERRORS 
   FATAL and IMPOVERISHED 
Subject             N (%)
Airspeed 19 (16.0) 
Proper Altitude 16 (13.4) 
Aircraft Control 15 (12.6) 
DECISION ERRORS 
FATAL and IMPOVERISHED 
Subject            N (%)
In-Flight Planning/Decision 26 (32.5) 
Flight into Known Adverse Weather 7 (8.8) 
Unintentional VFR Flight into IMC 5 (6.3) 
VIOLATIONS
FATAL and IMPOVERISHED 
Subject            N (%)
Intentional VFR Flight into IMC 33 (31.7) 
Procedures/Directives 13 (12.5) 
IFR Procedure 11 (10.6) 
Note: Percentages in the table reflect the percentage of a given 
causal factor within the HFACS category (e.g., airspeed 
accounted for 19 of 119 [16%] skill-based errors occurring in 
impoverished conditions where a fatality occurred). 
Table 6. Commuter Unsafe Acts Fine-Grained Analysis for Alaska versus the 
Rest of the U.S.
SKILL – BASED ERRORS 
Alaska Rest of the U.S. 
Subject      N (%) Subject      N (%)
Altitude/Clearance 52 (20.4) Altitude/Clearance 66 (16.5) 
Compensation for Winds 29 (11.4) Aircraft Control 36   (9.0) 
DECISION ERRORS 
Alaska Rest of the U.S. 
Subject      N (%) Subject      N (%)
Unsuitable Terrain Selection 39 (32.0) In-Flight Planning/Decision 57 (24.8) 
In-Flight Planning/Decision 18 (14.8) Pre-flight Planning/Decision Making 21   (9.1) 
VIOLATIONS
Alaska Rest of the U.S. 
Subject      N (%) Subject      N (%)
Intentional VFR Flight into IMC 38 (42.2) Procedures/Directives 40 (26.8) 
Procedures/Directives 14 (15.6) Intentional VFR Flight into IMC 19 (12.8) 
Note: Percentages in the table reflect the percentage of a given cause factor within the HFACS causal 
category (e.g., compensation for wind conditions accounted for 29 of 255 [11.4%] skill-based errors 
occurring in Alaskan commuter accidents). 
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Organizational Influences and Unsafe Supervision
Consistent with previous work (Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2001a), comparatively few commercial aviation accidents 
were associated with organizational and/or supervisory 
causal factors - particularly within the commuter aviation 
industry. In spite of this, a relatively large proportion of 
accidents involved issues related to operational processes. 
Causal factors associated with the remaining HFACS 
organizational causal categories, resource management and 
organizational climate, were rarely observed in the data. 
A closer inspection revealed that the particular type of 
operational process cited appeared to be dependent on the 
type of operation involved. Namely, air carrier accidents 
were typically associated with the manner in which pro-
cedures or directives were communicated assuming they 
existed at all. In contrast, commuter accidents were more 
often associated with a lack of organizational oversight. 
Exactly why this difference might exist requires a more 
in-depth investigation than what was performed here. 
However, the data do provide some insight into the 
types of organizational influences that have impacted 
commercial aviation safety.
Like organizational influences, causal factors attributed 
to middle-management centered on a single causal cat-
egory (i.e., inadequate supervision) rather than the full 
range of unsafe supervision described within the HFACS 
framework. That being said, nearly 1 in 10 air carrier ac-
cidents were associated with some manner of inadequate 
supervision. However, unlike organizational factors, large 
differences were not observed between air carrier and 
commuter operations. Instead, when supervisors were 
identified as causal in the chain of events leading to an 
accident, issues such as the lack of general supervision/
oversight or the failure to provide adequate training were 
usually identified.
Nevertheless, a larger question looms over the com-
mercial accident data. Namely, “Does the current accident 
data reflect the scope of the organizational/supervisory 
problem within commercial aviation, or is it possible that 
issues associated with middle- and upper-level manage-
ment are under-reported?”
Consider, for example, a recently published report in 
which 48 accidents across the spectrum of civil aviation 
in India were examined using HFACS (Gaur, 2005). 
Of these, nearly half (21/48) involved aircraft opera-
tions similar to those reported here. Although it was not 
possible to separate their summary findings by type of 
operation, it is interesting to note that Gaur reported 
a large percentage of accidents were attributed, at least 
in part, to organizational influences (52%) and unsafe 
supervision (25%). Presumably, most of these were as-
sociated with Indian commercial aviation, since GA 
operations are often not associated with the upper tiers 
of HFACS (Wiegmann et. al., 2005). To the extent that 
management of U.S. air carriers can be compared with 
foreign-flagged air carriers, at least this research suggests 
that current accident investigations may not capture all 
the organizational influences associated with commercial 
aviation accidents. At a minimum then, a review of how 
investigators are trained on organizational and supervi-
sory influences of accident causation may be in order. It 
might also prove beneficial to incorporate the use of a 
human error framework that includes supervisory and 
organizational components.
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts (Aircrew)
With a couple of notable exceptions, causal categories 
within the preconditions for unsafe acts were also lightly 
populated. One of those exceptions was the large propor-
tion of accidents (particularly among commuter aviation) 
influenced by prevailing weather conditions and reduced 
visibility. This was not particularly surprising since studies 
like the one conducted by Baker, Lamb, Li, and Dodd 
(1993) reported similar results in their examination of 
commuter accidents between 1983 and 1988. However, 
what makes this particular finding noteworthy is that the 
problem appears to have persisted even though the FAA 
and its industry partners have gone to great lengths over 
the last several years to improve pilot skills and weather 
decision-making.
Likewise, a sizeable effort has been invested in crew 
resource management training, particularly within the 
air carrier industry. However, in the two decades since 
its implementation, the debate continues over whether 
or not these pioneering efforts have been effective (Salas, 
Burke, Bowers, & Wilson, 2001). After all, the findings 
here and elsewhere (U.S. General Accounting Office, 
1997; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001a) suggest that failures 
of CRM still contribute to a large proportion of com-
mercial aviation accidents.
Even so, there may be reason for guarded optimism. 
While on average nearly one in five air carrier accidents 
examined here were due, at least in part, to a CRM failure, 
the percentage dropped dramatically to just one out of 55 
accidents in 2002, and that one involved an air carrier. 
Whether this was a statistical “blip on the screen” or a 
sustained improvement in the area remains to be seen.
While previous efforts suggested that factors associated 
with the physical environment and crew resource manage-
ment would be identified among the commercial data, it 
was surprising that other areas, in particular the condition 
of the operator (aircrew), were not identified in the accident 
record more often. The exception involved commuter 
aviation accidents, where a number of adverse mental states 
(64 out of 839 accidents, or 7.2%) and physical/mental 
limitations (43 out of 839, or 4.6%) were observed.
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In some ways, the fact that many commuter aviation 
operations are single-piloted may explain why adverse 
mental states played a more prominent role among these 
accidents. For instance, without a second set of eyes in 
the cockpit any distraction would likely be exacerbated 
and detract the pilot from the task at hand – flying the 
aircraft. Likewise, the aviation literature is ripe with 
examples where pressure, either self-induced or from 
management, has led pilots to accept risks beyond their 
abilities. At least one study suggests that this has been an 
issue with commuter aviation in Alaska (Conway, Mode, 
Berman, Martin, & Hill, 2005). 
Understandably then, diverted attention and pressure 
(whether self-induced or from management) were occa-
sionally cited in the commuter accident record. Because 
of this, it seems that some manner of risk management 
training and/or simply reinforcing the basic tenets of 
aviation (i.e., aviate, navigate, and communicate – in 
that order) should be a component of any intervention 
strategy employed by the commuter aviation industry.
Perhaps more disconcerting than issues of attention 
and psychological pressure were the large number of 
commuter aviation accidents associated with the pilot’s 
lack of experience – something rarely seen among the air 
carrier accidents examined. Whether this represents a lack 
of flight hours or merely inexperience with a particular 
operational setting or aircraft remains to be determined. 
Still, flight hours alone may not be sufficient to overcome 
the lack of experience observed here. After all, flying 
straight and level in VMC will not prepare a pilot for the 
complexities of instrument flight or the dangers of flying 
in other potentially hazardous environments. 
Unsafe Acts of Operators (Aircrew)
As with our previous efforts involving civil and military 
aviation (Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997, 1999, 2001a, 
2001b), skill-based errors were the most prevalent form 
of aircrew error among the commercial aviation accidents 
examined. Particularly widespread were technique errors 
associated with handling or controlling the aircraft. More 
important, when the commercial data reported here were 
combined with our previous investigations of GA acci-
dents (Wiegmann et al., 2005; Detwiler et. al., 2006) an 
interesting finding emerged. It appears that the percentage 
of skill-based errors associated with accidents increases 
systematically as one moves from air carrier (43%) to 
commuter (60%) to GA (73%) operations. 
At first glance, this would appear to suggest that pilot 
skill and proficiency are best among the air carrier industry 
and become progressively more suspect within commuter 
and GA. Recall that skill-based errors, by definition, occur 
during the execution of routine events (Reason, 1990; 
Rasmussen, 1982). Furthermore, once a particular skill 
is developed, it must be maintained through repetition 
and experience. Thus, most people would agree that GA 
pilots fly less and participate in fewer recurrent training 
sessions than their commercial counterparts. It stands 
to reason that their proficiency would be less than their 
commercial counterparts and may explain why skill-based 
errors are more prevalent among GA accidents.
However, the same cannot be said for commuter pilots 
that in some cases receive more flight time than air carrier 
pilots and may participate in the same level of recurrent 
training. Instead, the data seem to suggest that commuter 
aircrews fall somewhere in between air carrier and GA 
pilots with regard to proficiency – something that, if 
true, may necessitate additional regulations and currency 
requirements beyond what exists within the industry. 
On the other hand, the data may simply reflect well-
known differences in the sophistication of the aircraft 
being flown (e.g., was the aircraft instrument certified, 
was it outfitted with conventional instrumentation 
or technically advanced avionics). Or it could reflect 
operational requirements placed on the aircrews (e.g., 
flying very structured, well-planned operations versus 
comparatively less structured flights). Perhaps there is 
something still that has yet to be considered.
Regardless, skill-based errors were not the only error 
form identified within the commercial aviation database. 
Decision errors, violations, and, to a lesser extent, per-
ceptual errors were found in a large proportion of the 
accidents examined. For example, decision errors were 
observed in roughly four out of every ten commercial avia-
tion accidents, while violations and perceptual errors were 
observed in 23% and 7% of the accidents, respectively. 
Some have even argued that decision errors and violations 
are of the same ilk (i.e., both involve decisions by aircrew 
that go awry) and should actually be combined in the 
HFACS framework. If this were true, the combined causal 
category of decision error/violation would be roughly 
equivalent to that seen with skill-based errors. 
While on the surface, combining decision errors 
and violations may make sense, given that both involve 
“conscious decisions,” the motivation behind them, as 
well as the intervention strategies that have proven ef-
fective in the past, argue against it. As discussed earlier, 
violations represent the willful disregard for the rules and 
regulations and are often driven by intrinsic motivation, 
overconfidence, and other hazardous attitudes. In contrast, 
decision errors are often the result of a lack of knowledge 
and/or information, rather than one’s attitude. 
Therefore, while scenario-based training, in-flight 
planning aids, and education may improve pilot decision-
making, these approaches have been largely ineffective in 
stemming violations. Instead, enforcing current standards 
and increasing accountability in the cockpit may be the 
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only effective means to reduce violations of the rules – a 
tactic that is often difficult to employ in civil aviation. As 
a result, the FAA and the commercial aviation industry 
may have to look to other avenues to reduce violations 
such as the use of flight simulators that can demonstrate 
the hazards associated with violating the rules (Knecht, 
Harris, & Shappell, 2003).
Unlike skill-based errors, decision errors, and viola-
tions, perceptual errors contributed to the smallest per-
centage of commercial accidents, a percentage that was 
much less than that found in military research (Wiegmann 
& Shappell, 2003). However, given the non-tactical, 
non-aerobatic nature of commercial flight, this was not 
altogether unexpected. What’s more, a considerable effort 
has been brought to bear over the last several decades by 
the aerospace engineering and medicine communities 
to improve avionics, warning devices (ground collision 
avoidance systems), and awareness of perceptual errors 
due to visual and vestibular illusions. It would appear 
that those efforts have paid dividends.   
Still, it should also be noted that the differences observed 
between skill-based errors, decision errors, perceptual 
errors, and violations remained largely consistent across 
the 13 years of the study. The only possible exception 
was observed with air carrier accidents, where violations 
evidenced a small increase since 1993. Then again, some 
degree of caution should be taken in interpreting this 
particular finding, given that the air carrier data had to be 
collapsed into 3-4 year blocks due to the relatively small 
number of air carrier accidents occurring annually.
What this implies is that interventions employed in the 
1990s have had, at best, ubiquitous effects on the errors 
and violations committed by aircrew. Alternatively, it is 
quite possible that there has been no sustained impact of 
any particular intervention program. The latter should 
come as no surprise given that prior to this study, no 
comprehensive analysis of aircrew and supervisory error 
has been conducted using a theoretically derived frame-
work of accident causation.
14 CFR Part 135 – Commuter Operations
One of the purposes of this study was to combine the 
power of traditional situational and demographic variables 
with a theoretically-based, human error framework to 
identify human error trends amid commercial aviation 
accidents. However, because of the sample size, only com-
muter aviation lent itself to this sort of analysis.
Visual Conditions and Injury Severity
With the development of sophisticated navigation 
instrumentation and other avionics, it is possible to 
fly safely in environments without any external visual 
cues. Yet, piloting an aircraft into visually impoverished 
 environments without the necessary instruments or 
training can, and often does, lead to disaster. One needs 
to look no further than the accident data reported here 
to see the magnitude of this hazard to commuter avia-
tion. That is, nearly one-half of all commuter accidents 
occurred in a visually impoverished environment. Of 
those, an alarming 70% resulted in fatalities. In contrast, 
only about 30% of the accidents that occurred in broad 
daylight resulted in a fatality.
Although interesting, this finding alone contributes 
little to our understanding of “why” aircraft crash in 
the weather or at night. However, when combined 
with HFACS, a distinguishable pattern of human error 
emerged. Indeed, while skill-based and decision errors were 
cited in a large proportion of these accidents, violations 
of the rules and regulations were five times more likely 
to occur during accidents in visually impoverished than 
in clear conditions. That is, intentional VFR flight into 
IMC, poor in-flight planning, and simply the failure to 
control the aircraft all were commonly associated with 
fatal accidents-particularly when they occurred in visually 
impoverished environments. What’s more alarming, many 
of these causal factors have been identified to some extent 
in the past (e.g., Baker, Lamb, Li, & Dodd, 1993).
So why is this still a problem and, more importantly, 
how could a professional pilot make such a decision to 
fly into hazardous weather? At least one study (Burian, 
Orasanu, & Hitt, 2000) suggests that pilots with less 
experience may “not trust what their eyes are telling 
them and so proceed on blindly” (p. 25). Referred to as 
plan continuation errors, Wiegmann, Goh, and O’Hare 
(2002) suggest that under certain conditions these errors 
are more often attributable to poor situation assessment 
than to motivational judgment, per se. In other words, 
sometimes experienced pilots simply misjudge the situ-
ation and make an honest mistake. Regardless, proper 
planning, both in the air and on the ground, is a critical 
component of flight safety. The solution may be to improve 
the quality of weather-related information to the pilot so 
that sound go/no-go decisions can be made.
However, it is one thing to “misjudge” weather in-
formation or make a bad decision, it is quite another 
to willfully fly into IMC without proper training or 
equipment. Such an act begs the question, “Why would 
someone take such an exceptional risk?” 
One possibility is social pressure. Indeed there are 
several examples of pilots being pressured by passengers 
or other aircrew to continue to their destination despite 
cues that they should do otherwise (Holbrook, Orasanu, 
& McCoy, 2003). In fact, at least for GA, the presence 
of passengers on board seems to influence the likelihood 
that an accident would be associated with VFR flight 
into IMC (Goh & Wiegmann, 2002). 
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Still, social pressures cannot fully explain why a pilot 
would elect to fly VFR into IMC – particularly during 
cargo or repositioning flights where no passengers are 
on board. Alternatively, O’Hare and his colleagues (Batt 
& O’Hare, 2005; O’Hare & Owen, 1999; O’Hare & 
Smitheram, 1995) have offered an explanation structured 
around how pilots frame the situation of continuing or 
discontinuing flight into adverse weather. They found 
that pilots who framed diverting from a flight plan as a 
loss (e.g., loss of time, economic loss, or expense of effort) 
tend to continue flight into adverse weather; whereas 
those who frame a rerouting decision as a gain (e.g., in 
personal safety) tend to divert more. Indeed, gains and 
losses take on more meaning as pilots get closer to their 
destination.
Another possibility is that commuter pilots, on aver-
age, may not have the requisite experience to decide 
when a particular situation is beyond their ability. While 
this argument may hold for GA, where pilot experience 
varies from the novice to pilots with thousands of flight 
hours, commuter pilots typically have more experience 
than their GA counterparts well before their first paying 
passenger boards the aircraft. However, experience is a 
double-edged sword as others (e.g., Thomson, Onkal, 
Avcioglu, & Goodwin, 2004) have suggested that, as 
pilots gain experience through more flight hours, risk 
taking may also increase due to overconfidence and suc-
cessful exposure to risky events. Put simply, experts may 
be more likely to take risks than novices. 
Regional Differences
In many ways, Alaska is the one of the world’s most 
demanding aviation environments, offering virtually every 
situation a pilot or operator might be confronted with. In 
a sense, there are very few situations experienced by pilots 
in the lower 48 states that have not been experienced by 
those in Alaska. Perhaps this is why few differences were 
observed in the pattern of human error associated with 
Alaska and the rest of the U.S.
However, one area where differences did exist was the 
violation of the rules and regulations; to be specific, VFR 
flight into IMC. Precisely why commuter pilots would 
be more prone to fly into adverse weather in Alaska than 
the rest of the U.S. is unknown, but at least one study 
(Conway, et. al., 2005) has shown that aircrews of high-
risk operators in Alaska (those with a higher fatal crash 
rate than would be expected given the number of pilots 
they employed) differed from other operators in both 
experience and working conditions. On average pilots of 
high risk operators worked one hour more per day and 
10 hours more per week than control pilots. They were 
also more likely to fly into unknown weather conditions. 
Although their study did not identify any specific reason 
these pilots were more prone to take risks, it did sug-
gest that factors such as “pilot fatigue and experience, 
financial pressures on operators, and inadequate weather 
information,” particularly in combination, may provide 
some clues.
Another area where regional differences existed 
involved takeoff and landing from unsuitable terrain. 
Although rarely associated with fatalities, these accidents 
are no less important given the staggering cost to recover 
an aircraft stuck on a sandbar or some other remote area. 
Unlike VFR flight into IMC, these accidents are much 
easier to understand because there are simply not many 
concrete runways and taxiways in Alaska. Instead, Alas-
kan commuter pilots may have to resort to frozen ice, 
sandbars, and other “natural runways” for support. Not 
surprising, what appears suitable from the air turns out 
to be unsuitable for aircraft when landed upon.
The obvious solution is to provide more suitable run-
ways; pour more concrete, if you will. However, given the 
remoteness and harsh conditions of some of these areas, 
providing traditional runways would not be practical. 
Alternatively, some sort of training and awareness of 
what constitutes a suitable landing area, combined with 
the creation of more traditional runways, where possible, 
may be the only viable solution.
In light of the unique nature of the Alaskan environ-
ment, the FAA and Alaskan aviation community have 
joined efforts to employ a variety of safety programs aimed 
at reducing accidents associated with commuter opera-
tions. With programs like the FAA’s Circle of Safety and 
Capstone, and non-profit aviation safety organizations like 
the Medallion Foundation, it is hoped that improvements 
in Alaskan aviation safety will be realized. 
CONCLUSIONS
We are often told that sometimes the best studies ask 
more questions than they answer. If that sage wisdom is 
indeed true, then perhaps the present study was worth-
while. Regardless of one’s opinion of accident data and the 
current aviation accident investigation process, these data 
represent our best understanding of the underlying human 
error component of commercial aviation accidents. Even 
more, the results presented here represent the marriage 
of traditional demographic and human error analyses of 
commercial aviation (air carrier and commuter). While 
some of the findings may come as no surprise, they do 
provide data, where often only opinion existed. What’s 
more, they provide a foundation for the development, 
implementation, and quantifiable assessment of putative 
intervention and mitigation strategies.
18
REFERENCES
Baker, S. (1995). Putting “human error” into perspec-
tive. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 
66, 521.
Baker, S., Lamb, M., Li, G., & Dodd, R. (1993). Human 
factors in crashes of commuter airplanes. Aviation, 
Space, and Environmental Medicine, 64, 63-8.
Batt, R. & O’Hare (2005). Pilot behaviors in the face 
of adverse weather: A new look at an old problem. 
Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine, 76, 
552-9. 
Billings, C. & Reynard, W. (1984). Human factors in 
aircraft incidents: Results of a 7-year study. Aviation, 
Space, and Environmental Medicine, 55, 960-5.
Burian, B., Orasanu, J., & Hitt, J. (2000). Weather-
related decision errors: differences across flight 
types. Proceedings of the XIVth Triennial Congress 
of the International Ergonomics Association/44th An-
nual Meeting of the Human Factors and Ergonomics 
Society, pp. 22-4.
Conway, G., Mode, N., Berman, M., Martin, S., & 
Hill, A. (2005). Flight safety in Alaska: Compar-
ing attitudes and practices of high- and low-risk 
air carriers. Aviation, Space, and Environmental 
Medicine, 76, 52-7.
Detwiler, C., Hackworth, C., Holcomb, K., Boquet, 
A., Pfleiderer, E., Wiegmann, D., & Shappell, S. 
(2006). Beneath the tip of the iceberg: A human fac-
tors analysis of general aviation accidents in Alaska 
verses the rest of the United States. Federal Aviation 
Administration, Office of Aerospace Medicine 
Technical Report No. DOT/FAA/AM-06/7. Office 
of Aerospace Medicine: Washington, DC.
Gaur, D. (2005). Human factors analysis and classifica-
tion system applied to civil aircraft accidents in 
India. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 
76, 501-5.
Goh, J. & Wiegmann, D. (2002). Human error analysis 
of accidents involving visual flight rules flight into 
adverse weather. Aviation, Space, and Environmental 
Medicine, 78(8), 817-22.
Heinrich, H., Peterson, D., & Roos, N. (1931). Industrial 
accident prevention: A safety management approach 
(1st ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Holbrook, J., Orasanu, J., & McCoy, C. (2003). Weather-
related decision making by aviators in Alaska. 
Proceedings of the 12th International Symposium on 
Aviation Psychology, 576-81.
Knecht, W., Harris, H., & Shappell, S. (2003). Effects 
of visibility, cloud ceiling and financial incentive 
on general aviation voluntary takeoff into adverse 
weather. Proceedings of the 12th International Sym-
posium on Aviation Psychology, 669-73.
Li, G., Baker, S., Grabowski., J., & Rebok, G. (2001). 
Factors associated with pilot error in aviation 
crashes. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medi-
cine, 72, 52-8.
Nicogossian, A.E., Huntoon, C.L., & Pool, S.L. (1994). 
Space physiology and medicine (3rd ed.). Baltimore, 
MD: Williams and Wilkins.
O’Hare, D. & Owen, D. (1999). Continued VFR into 
IMC: An empirical investigation of the possible causes; 
Final report on preliminary study. Unpublished 
manuscript. University of Otago, Dunedin, New 
Zealand.
O’Hare, D. & Smitheram, T. (1995). “Pressing on” 
into deteriorating conditions: An application of 
behavioral decision theory to pilot decision mak-
ing. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 5, 
351-70.
Rasmussen, J. (1982). Human errors: A taxonomy 
for describing human malfunction in industrial 
installations. Journal of Occupational Accidents, 4, 
311-33.
Reason, J. (1990). Human error. New York, NY: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Reinhart, R.O. (1996). Basic flight physiology (2nd ed.). 
New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Salas, E., Burke, C.S., Bowers, C.A., & Wilson, K.A. 
(2001). Team training in the skies: Does crew 
resource management training work? Human Fac-
tors, 4, 641-74.
Shappell, S. & Wiegmann, D. (1995). Controlled flight 
into terrain: The utility of an information process-
ing approach to mishap causal factors. Proceedings 
of the Eighth International Symposium on Aviation 
Psychology, The Ohio State University, 1300-6.
Shappell, S. & Wiegmann, D. (1996). U.S. naval aviation 
mishaps 1977-92: Differences between single- and 
dual-piloted aircraft. Aviation, Space, and Environ-
mental Medicine, 67(1), 65-9.
19
Shappell, S. & Wiegmann, D. (1997). Why would an 
experienced aviator fly a perfectly good aircraft into 
the ground? Proceedings of the Ninth International 
Symposium on Aviation Psychology, The Ohio State 
University, 26-32.
Shappell, S. & Wiegmann, D. (2003a). A human error 
analysis of general aviation controlled flight into 
terrain (CFIT) accidents occurring between 1990-
1998. Federal Aviation Administration, Office of 
Aerospace Medicine Technical Report No. DOT/
FAA/AM-03/4. Office of Aerospace Medicine: 
Washington, DC.
Shappell, S. & Wiegmann, D. (2003b). Reshaping the 
way we look at general aviation accidents using the 
human factors analysis and classification system. 
Proceedings of the Twelfth International Symposium on 
Aviation Psychology, The Ohio State University).
Shappell, S. & Wiegmann, D. (2004). HFACS analysis 
of military and civilian aviation accidents: A North 
American comparison. Proceedings of the Annual 
Meeting of the International Society of Air Safety 
Investigators, Gold Coast, Australia.
Thomson, M., Onkal, D., Avcioglu, A., & Goodwin, 
P. (2004). Aviation risk perception: A comparison 
between experts and novices. Risk Analysis, 6, 
1585-95.
United States General Accounting Office (1997). Hu-
man Factors: FAA’s guidance and oversight of pilot 
crew resource management training can be improved. 
(GAO/RCED-98-7). Washington, DC: Author.
Wickens, C.D. & Hollands, J.G. (2000). Engineering 
psychology and human performance (3rd ed.). Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Wiegmann, D., Goh, J., & O’Hare, D. (2002). The 
role of situation assessment and flight experience 
in pilots’ decisions to continue visual flight rules 
flight into adverse weather. Human Factors, 44(2), 
189-97.
Wiegmann, D. & Shappell, S. (1997). Human factors 
analysis of post-accident data: Applying theoreti-
cal taxonomies of human error. The International 
Journal of Aviation Psychology, 7(1), 67-81.
Wiegmann, D. & Shappell, S. (1999). Human error and 
crew resource management failures in naval avia-
tion mishaps: A review of U.S. Naval Safety Center 
data, 1990-96. Aviation, Space, and Environmental 
Medicine, 70(12), 1147-51.
Wiegmann, D. & Shappell, S. (2001a). Human error 
analysis of commercial aviation accidents: Appli-
cation of the Human Factors Analysis and Clas-
sification System (HFACS). Aviation, Space and 
Environmental Medicine, 72, 1006-16.
Wiegmann, D. & Shappell, S. (2001b). Human error 
perspectives in aviation. International Journal of 
Aviation Psychology, 11(4), 341-57.
Wiegmann, D. & Shappell, S. (2003). A human error 
approach to aviation accident analysis: The human 
factors analysis and classification system. Burlington, 
VT: Ashgate.
Wiegmann, D., Shappell, S., Boquet, A., Detwiler, C., 
Holcomb, K., & Faaborg, T. (2005). Human error 
and general aviation accidents: A comprehensive, 
fine-grained analysis using HFACS. Federal Avia-
tion Administration, Office of Aerospace Medicine 
Technical Report No. DOT/FAA/AM-05/24. Of-
fice of Aerospace Medicine: Washington, DC.

